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Abstract: Unlike the old member states that compensate the negative net birth rate with immigra-
tion, the new EU member states face both migrational and natural demographic decline. 
In the last decade, poor level of economic development as well as the accession to the EU 
encouraged net emigration from the new member states. Panel data for the 12 new member 
states for the 2007 - 2016 period were used to determine how the length of membership and 
GDP per capita trailing behind the EU average affect the proportion of the net emigration. 
It has been shown that on average a country has to reach at least 85 percent of the average 
EU GDP p.c. (measured in PPS) to prevent emigration, but this level increases with each 
year of membership by 1.37 percentage points.
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Introduction
Most of the new EU member states are facing demographic catastrophe as compared to 
the old member states (EU15), which in general have a total population increase. Hav-
ing aging population and birth rates below death rates as a trend across the entire EU, 
the new member states additionally experience strong emigration tendencies, while the 
old ones mostly have a positive migration balance.  
Table 1 shows population trends in EU countries in the 2003-2016 period and GDP 
per capita. Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Malta had an increase in popu-
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lation, while the other 9 new member states had a decrease. Meanwhile, only econom-
ically weaker old member states (GDP p.c. index below 100, which is the EU average) 
had a population decline, like Portugal and Greece. Spain and Italy were below the EU 
average, but had an increase in population, which is owed to the fact that these coun-
tries represent the “doors for immigration”, especially since the Arab Spring. All the 
other countries show important relation: negative population balance (italic) is related 
to the below average GDP per capita, while positive population balance (bold) is relat-
ed to the above average GDP per capita. The exceptions are marked in grey. 
Each exception has its different reason for it. For example the case of Czechia can 
be explained by its geographic position that allows the local population to work in the 
neighbouring countries (Germany, primarily). It is interesting that these findings are 
very similar to Kaczmarczyk & Okólski (2005) which shows that most of the “excep-
tion” countries have  rather weak tendency to migrate.  
Table 1: EU countries’ population in 2003 and 2016, and GDP p.c. PPS index
Country\Year Population in 2003
Population in 
2016 Population change
GDP p.c. PPS index in 2016 
(EU average = 100)
Belgium 10355844 11311117 9% 117
Bulgaria 7805506 7153784 -8% 49
Czechia 10192649 10553843 4% 88
Denmark 5383507 5707251 6% 125
Germany 81368051 82175684 1% 123
Estonia 1375190 1315944 -4% 74
Ireland 3964191 4724720 19% 183
Greece 10915770 10783748 -1% 66
Spain 41827838 46440099 11% 92
France 61864088 66759950 8% 104
Croatia 4305384 4190669 -3% 60
Italy 57130506 60665551 6% 96
Cyprus 713720 848319 19% 82
Latvia 2299390 1968957 -14% 65
Lithuania 3431497 2888558 -16% 75
Luxembourg 448300 576249 29% 259
Hungary 10142362 9830485 -3% 68
Malta 397296 434403 9% 95
Netherlands 16192572 16979120 5% 129
Austria 8100273 8690076 7% 127
Poland 38218531 37967209 -1% 69
Portugal 10444592 10341330 -1% 77
Romania 21627509 19760314 -9% 59
Slovenia 1995033 2064188 3% 84
Slovakia 5374873 5426252 1% 77
Finland 5206295 5487308 5% 109
Sweden 8940788 9851017 10% 124
United Kingdom 59501394 65382556 10% 108
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.
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These findings suggest a correlation between the economic performance and the 
population balance, which could in turn help predict future tendencies. However, 
the exceptions indicate there are other factors too. Furthermore, population balance 
should be broken into a natural and migrational segment. 
Figure 1 shows total emigration from the new EU member states. The figure un-
doubtedly indicates that the accession to the EU represents a significant emigration 
factor for the new member states.
Figure 1: Total new EU member states emigration (2001-2015)
Source: Eurostat
The total new member states pre-accession emigration balance was stable around 
118,000, but after the accession started it went up to 137,000, 143,000 and 169,000 
in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.   The emigration explosion happened in 2008 
during the crisis and remained high after the crisis wave had diminished. It suggests 
that the crisis was merely a trigger, and when the wave started, many others, disap-
pointed with the perspective in their homelands, decided to leave. 
Figure 2 portrays the share of emigration from the new member states (by states) 
in total population of the selected old member states with the most intense immigra-
tion (UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Austria and Sweden). The figure shows that the 
Great Recession had caused intense migration that later calmed down along with the 
crisis wave. However, there are exceptions.  For example, Croatia’s long lasting crisis 
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tion of the selected countries to boom to almost 0.85 percent of the overall population 
in 2015. Following this alarming data, the authors will put additional focus on the 
Croatian case in this paper. 
Figure 2: Share of emigrants from the new member states in the overall population 
of selected EU states for the 2007 – 2015 period
Source: Own analysis based on data of the national bureaus of statistics in the UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Austria 
and Sweden.
 
Sharing the same pan-Europe fertility trend, the new EU member states will like-
ly cause a sharp decline in the working-age population, which will undoubtedly limit 
their economic growth in the future. Given the net migration trend, these countries 
will fail to generate sufficient human capital to maintain (and increase) the level of 
their economic activity. In 2010, Macura (2010) offered a 40-year projection for the 
working-age population in European countries. The projections were based on the as-
sumptions of gradual recovery of fertility rate and zero migration. Under these rather 
optimistic assumptions, Macura showed that most of the SEE countries would see 
30-40 percent of its workforce diminish in the given 40-year period. Given the latest 
net migration figures, we conclude that the countries in question will experience not 
only demographic but also economic collapse.
Following the assumption that the majority of emigration happens for economic 
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el of economic development (measured by GDP p.c.) of the new member states that 
would stop further migration. The intention of the authors is to draw the attention of 
the scientific community as well as of policy makers to this far-reaching and detri-
mental phenomenon. As Clemens (2011, p. 83) points out, migration economics has 
focused mainly on how the movement of people affects the economies that receive 
the migrants, yet the effect of emigration went relatively neglected. The implications 
of the paper are especially important for the accession countries from the Western 
Balkans whose GDP p.c. levels lag considerably behind the new EU member states 
that struggle with migration. 
Given the aforementioned, Section 2 analyses the literature to determine factors 
crucial for emigration in the similar studies. The authors find that majority of studies 
point to the economic reasons behind emigration. In Section 3, econometric model 
based on a panel data was made. The authors performed the simulation based on the 
emigration data for the 12 new EU member states (all except Malta) from 2007 to 
2016. Section 4 provides the results of the simulation as well as their interpretation 
in the light of expected emigration movements. Section 5 gives general conclusions, 
discusses obvious shortcomings of the analysis and sets ground for future research.  
Literature Overview
Traditionally, it is believed that migration is influenced by differences in opportu-
nities (i.e.  income, employment, quality of life). This is logical but rather limited 
view on migration. Evidence indicates that migration does not occur exclusively from 
the poorest towards the wealthiest countries. Moreover, the volume of migration in-
creases with the development of the country. Castles et al. (2013, p. 25) explain this 
phenomenon with improved access to information and education, better social capital 
and financial resources that impact people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate. 
Generally, the theoretical approach to migration as well as empirical studies evolved 
along with general socio-economic context in the past century. 
The earliest work of Ravenstein (1885) and Hicks (1932) analyse migration as a 
process whose causes are predominantly economic (i.e. maximizing the utility of 
individuals subject to budget constraint). Previous models set ground for neoclassical 
migration theory that sees migration as a function of geographical differences be-
tween supply and demand for labour, thus optimizing the allocation of the production 
factors (Rostow, 1960; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1980; Williamson, 1988; Bor-
jas, 1989). The neoclassical models are criticized to see migration as a decision of the 
perfectly rational individuals based on the rational cost-benefit analyses. 
As a modification of the neoclassical approach to migration, Sjaastad (1962) in-
troduced human capital model for migration treating migration as an investment 
decision. According to this model, migration occurs when expected present value 
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of migration returns exceeds costs of migration, including psychological costs (e.g. 
separation from friends and family). The model also introduces variables influencing 
the decision based on personal characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.). Stark & 
Bloom (1985) argue that migration behaviour of individuals can be expected to differ 
in accordance with their perceived relative deprivation and their skill levels.
Mincer (1978) added a new perspective to migration arguing that it is more a 
family rather than individual decision and that migration occurs only when expected 
returns of a family member internalise expected losses of other family members. 
This theory became more influential with the rise of female workforce, indicating 
that migration decision depends on partner’s migration decision and thus explains 
rising marital instability.  Contrary to that, alternative assumption that led to a dif-
ferent class of migration models (see Stark, 1991) is that families show risk-sharing 
behaviour which means that they use their ability to diversify resources (i.e. labour) 
in order to minimise the risk to family income (e.g. one member of the family work-
ing abroad). Further expanding of the model included consideration of social and 
informational networks, as well as social capital, suggesting that after initial migrants 
face the highest costs, migration can gradually become a self-perpetuating process 
(Massey, 1990; Boyd, 1989). 
A useful perspective of labour migration integrating all previous models can be 
given in the so-called “push and pull” framework. Lee (1966) saw migration deci-
sion as a result of “plus” and “minus” factors divided into three areas: origin and 
destination, obstacles to migration and personal factors. Based on previous theoreti-
cal framework, various “push-pull” models arose (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983; Portes & 
Böröcz,1989). According to these models, a number of demographic, political and 
economic factors influence population to be “pushed” out of their countries (e.g. pop-
ulation increase, lack of working opportunities, political repression, etc.), while other 
factors “pull” them toward new destinations (e.g. unsatisfied demand for labour, po-
litical freedoms, etc.). The “push-pull” models are criticized to be purely descriptive 
and arbitrary (Castles et al., 2013), unable to take into account relative importance of 
different factors, as well as unable to explain simultaneous migratory movements in 
and out of a country, high level migration in the case of low fertility rate countries, 
etc. 
Empirical studies provide evidence supporting previous models in different ways. 
Haug (2008) demonstrates the strong relation between social capital at the place of 
destination and decision to migrate (or return to the place of residence) based on data 
for Bulgarian and Italian migrants in Germany. Jennisen (2002) confirms the impact 
of GDP p.c. and unemployment on a country’s net international migration based on 
the 1960-1998 period data in Western Europe. Gallardo-Sejas et al. (2006) demon-
strate that the most important explanatory factors for international immigration in 13 
European destination countries are population and distance factors, macroeconomic 
conditions, cultural proximity, and the existence of narrow trade relationships. Mayda 
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(2005) confirms that immigration in 14 OECD countries was predominantly driven 
by the difference in salary levels. Cultural, population and distance factors have their 
expected impact on the size of migration in accordance with the theoretical models. 
Sandu & De Jong (1996) explored the migration intentions of Romanians during 
the 1990s and demonstrated that labour market demand in foreign countries, as well 
as democratic values strongly influenced decision to migrate. On a district level, mi-
gration also depends on the local political profile. The similar results were obtained 
in the case of less developed countries such as Albania (Mançellari et al., 1996). 
Other studies (Boncea, 2009) indicate that among higher educated groups (such as 
physicians) a decision to migrate is primarily influenced by the difference in salary 
in Romania and other countries. Other determinants with significant importance are 
career opportunities and availability of facilities. Political stability and personal fac-
tors are of lesser importance. 
Kaczmarczyk & Okólski (2005) argue that CEE represents a separate migration 
entity sharing common characteristics regarding migration factors. As authors show, 
the CEE countries are characterized by relatively very high overall mobility, but there 
are also countries with moderate (Estonia and Latvia) or even very weak migration 
intensity (the Czech Republic and Hungary). With respect to (long-term) migration 
balance with the West, probably in only one country (the Czech Republic) it is sig-
nificantly positive, whereas in two or three other (Hungary, the Slovak Republic and 
maybe Lithuania) its value seems negligible. The rest of CEE has a considerable 
negative balance. Favell (2008) argues that the East - West Europe migration story 
is also one of high-skilled migration. The author reveals the strong impact of human 
and social capital on migration towards Western Europe in the post-enlargement pe-
riod. However, there are also findings that show that immigration did not lower the 
unemployment. Contrary, it increased the welfare state expenses (Fenwick, 2019).
Data and Methodology
Based on the introductory analysis in this paper, and the similar surveys analysed 
above, after careful observation of a number of variables for emigration, overall 
economy performance and the presence in the EU were chosen. The following model 
was created:
(1)
where NEM stands for net emigration in population ratio, from the new member 
states to the other EU states, GY is its annual percentage change, IND is the index of 
GDP per capita in PPS where 100 is the EU average, and EUY is the number of years 
of a country in the EU. 
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The regressor, NEM, is a normalized net annual emigration variable (net emigra-
tion is shown as an index to the total population, which is denoted as 100), since it is 
completely different if e.g. Croatia, having around 4.2 mill inhabitants, and Poland, 
having 38 mill inhabitants, lose the same number of people. The data are collected 
from the national bureaus of statistics in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Ireland, France 
and the United Kingdom, which are the main destinations for the new member states’ 
emigrants.
EUY regressor measures the time from the country’s accession to the EU. In the 
introductory analysis, it was shown that the length of stay was related to the emigra-
tion tendencies. It could be explained as follows: it takes time for the emigrants to see 
how the things are over the fence, and after a while, when they prepare and introduce 
themselves to the new culture, they take the plunge and set off. Encouraged by the 
other emigrants, those less eager to leave decide to leave afterwards, since they al-
ready have a welcoming community in the recipient country.
Performance of the entire economy is measured by GDP per capita measured in 
purchasing power standard by Eurostat. Two variables are based on this value: IND, 
which is an index of the mentioned data, where the EU average is set to 100, thus 
adjusting the absolute average, which floats, to a fixed reference value. The other 
variable, GY, shows the rate of change of GDP per capita (PPS). While the former 
shows how far from the average the country currently is, the latter shows dynamics. 
The reason for introduction of both variables is that sometimes people, although their 
economy is still weak (shown by IND), have a boost of optimism seeing good prog-
ress (shown by GY). The estimate of the model will show if some of these variables 
are obsolete. Since variables IND and GY are deducted from the same data set, there 
is a significant multicollinearity present. Hence it is very probable that one of these 
variables would be omitted from the model.
The dataset encompasses all new member states except Malta, which is an outlier 
due to the size and the economic activity, which leaves 12 cross-section categories. 
The data are observed in the 2007 – 2016 period (10 years). The panel data were used 
to estimate the model. The panel has 120 pieces of data, fully balanced. The model 
(1) will be estimated and possibly adjusted and restructured.
Findings
An econometric estimate of the model (1) based on the previously introduced panel 
data was conducted. In this estimate, it was shown that GY was to be omitted from 
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 and its results are as follows:
       
(3)
The model has shown that each additional year in the EU on average leads to the 
increase in the net emigration of the new member state to the old member states by 
0.0092 percentage points, while the rise in GDP per capita in PPS index (EU average 
= 100) by 1 point on average decreases net emigration in population ratio by 0.0067 
percentage points. There is also a systemic tendency for the new member states to 
leave their countries for Western Europe and it accounts on average for almost 0.6 
percentage points of the net emigration in population ratio.
The explanation for it could be found in a thorough analysis of the factors that 
affect this constant to be that high; the most probable, which is to be a part of further 
analysis of this far-reaching and detrimental phenomenon, is the difference between 
the development of the society in the new and the old member states. The measure for 
that could be the Worldwide Governance Index (WGI, published by the World Bank) 
and the Economic Freedom Index (EFI, published by The Heritage Foundation).
The estimated model was used to predict the emigrational tendencies in Croatia. 
If Croatia is to stop the emigration wave, then NEM should be equal to 0:
        (4a)
    (4b)
      (4)
The result shows that the country requires the GDP p.c. (PPS) index to be at least 
85.42 (where 100 is the EU average) to stop emigration, but this value increases with 
each year of the membership by 1.37. This factor might be called the “integration fac-
tor” of the EU, showing that population, as the time goes by, will face the increasing 
mobility which is crucial for the solution of the euro-sclerosis problem. Specifically, 
Croatia would require an IND = 85.42 + 1.37×7 = 96.4 percent of GDP p.c. of the EU 
average (PPS) in 2018 to stop emigration, while in 2019 it would grow up to 97.77 
percent. It is expected it would grow even beyond the EU average, until it approaches 
the average of the rich destination countries, like Germany, Austria and Ireland. Then 
it expected it would slow down and the linearity would disappear.
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constant to be that high; the most probable, which is to be a part of further analysis of this far-
reaching and detrimental phenomenon, is the difference between the development of the society 
in the new and the old member states. T e easure for that could be the Worldwide Governance 
Index (WGI, published by the Worl  Bank) and the Economic Fre om Index (EFI, published by 
The Heritag  F undati n). 
The estimated model was used to predict th  emigrationa  ten encies in C oati . If Croatia is to 
stop the emigration wave, then NEM should be eq al to 0: 
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of the euro-sclerosis problem. Specifically, Croatia w uld equire an IND = 85.42 + 1.37×7 = 
96.4 percen  of GDP p.c. of the EU average (PPS) in 2018 to st p emigration, while in 2019 it 
would grow up to 97.77 percent. It is expected it would grow even bey nd the EU average, until 
it approaches the average of the rich destination countries, like Germany, Austria and Ireland. 




A majority of the new member states in the European Union have shown the increase in the 
emigration since their accession. Some countries, like the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, have stopped these tendencies even though they have experienced substantial increase 
in the net emigration during the Great Recession. As this emigration is extremely far-reaching, 
due to inadequate birth rate in the observed countries, they slowly, but certainly, go towards the 
collapse of the public health and pension system, which is mostly based on a solidarity principle 
in the entire post-transitional block. Similarly, in the longer run, the inability of these countries to 
generate sufficient human capital to maintain economic growth will lead to economic collapse.  
In order to predict and help preventing the undesired effects, this paper first analysed the 
literature to determine factors crucial for the emigration in the similar studies. Afterwards, a 
panel data econometric analysis was made, based on the emigration data for the 12 new EU 
member states (all except Malta) from 2007 to 2016. It was determined that having at least 85 
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Conclusion
A majority of the new member states in the European Union have shown the increase 
in the emigration since their accession. Some countries, like the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia, have stopped these tendencies even though they have experienced 
substantial increase in the net emigration during the Great Recession. As this emigra-
tion is extremely far-reaching, due to inadequate birth rate in the observed countries, 
they slowly, but certainly, go towards the collapse of the public health and pension 
system, which is mostly based on a solidarity principle in the entire post-transitional 
block. Similarly, in the longer run, the inability of these countries to generate suffi-
cient human capital to maintain economic growth will lead to economic collapse. 
In order to predict and help preventing the undesired effects, this paper first an-
alysed the literature to determine factors crucial for the emigration in the similar 
studies. Afterwards, a panel data econometric analysis was made, based on the emi-
gration data for the 12 new EU member states (all except Malta) from 2007 to 2016. It 
was determined that having at least 85 percent of GDP per capita of the EU average, 
measured in PPS, was required to prevent the emigration, but this level increases by 
1.37 percentage points for each year of membership. 
These findings suggest that the demographic decline in Western Europe is patched 
up by “demographic cannibalism” from Eastern Europe, thus aggravating their situ-
ation even further. The reach of the emigration in the new member states is largely 
explained by this model, showing why it is so intense in the poorest countries, like 
Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, and giving the forecast for the future, which is, given 
the current level of economic development, extremely detrimental for those countries 
which are far from the non-emigration level of development.
This model has taken into account only the net-immigration old EU member 
states, excluding the net emigration countries like Italy and Spain, but which wel-
comed many Romanians. To get a wider picture, and not only the EU inter-migration, 
a broader set of countries, including the overseas countries too, should be taken into 
account. Furthermore, an immigration policy as well as the quality of institutions 
and the level of economic freedom should be included, since Spain, which has net 
emigration, has buffed these tendencies with the non-EU immigration welcoming 
policies, while Hungary does just the opposite and has almost no immigration from 
non-EU countries.
However, the conclusion that the GDP p.c. level explains most of the migration 
flow from the new EU member states has its limitations. Namely, a part of the brain 
drain from these countries is caused by inability of young people to find attractive 
jobs after finishing their education1. 
The implications of this paper are especially important for the accession countries 
from the Western Balkans whose GDP p.c. levels lag considerably behind the new 
EU member states that struggle with emigration. In the absence of some compre-
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hensive proactive reaction on the policy level of these countries and/or limitation of 
labour movements in Western Europe, until certain level of economic development is 
achieved (85 percent of the EU average GDP p.c.), the accession of these countries to 
the EU threatens do devastate them both demographically and economically. 
NOTES
1 This refers to the fields like medicine, molecular biology and the like.
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